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I am grateful to the editor of JITTA for 
the opportunity to append a brief response to 
Cathy Urquhart’s article (Urquhart 2002);  I 
am also pleased that Dr Urquhart has taken the 
trouble to reply to my earlier piece, and so 
develop the debate on GTM. 
In many regards we are in agreement; 
we both wish to stress the usefulness of the 
method, we both understand that the early 
formulations may now need to be revised or 
reinterpreted, and we are both concerned that 
the philosophical underpinnings of the method 
be clarified. 
In other respects our views diverge, and 
some of the differences are important.  I think 
that Urquhart is too accommodating to 
positivism in general, and consequently to the 
positivist inclinations of GTM.  She states that 
‘GTM is paradoxical and unique’ in its claims 
to be a systematic way of generating theory 
from qualitative data.  Unless I have 
misinterpreted her entirely, the unstated 
corollaries of this sentiment are that systematic 
theory generation is primarily associated with 
quantitative data, and that all non-GTM ways 
of generating theory from qualitative data are 
unsystematic – otherwise GTM would not be 
unique.  I would dispute these ideas, and 
perhaps when stated so bluntly, Urquhart 
would as well. 
That Urquhart expresses herself in this 
manner, indicates that she is prepared to offer 
credence to a scientistic or positivist 
orientation; and this then explains her 
arguments regarding data and induction:  
Which are where we diverge most sharply.  I 
do not understand why she thinks that 
induction is not intimately associated with 
positivism.  She states that GTM is ‘above all 
… an inductive method … yet it is seen as a 
post positivist1 method’.  The concept of 
phenomenalism is central to Kolakowski’s 
characterization of positivism, and Giddens 
(1974) specifically uses the term in 
Kolakowski’s sense.  As such positivism 
centers around phenomenalism, which implies 
induction; and classic GTM is unerringly 
inductive. 
I must admit that Urquhart’s discussion 
of phenomenalism seemed confused, until I 
realized that the fault was mine in mentioning 
Haig’s (1995) work.  Haig’s vain effort to 
rescue GTM from positivism introduces the 
distinction between data and phenomena – but 
the latter is used in a rather haphazard fashion 
and certainly does not equate to 
phenomenalism as used by Giddens (1974).  In 
many ways, I rather wish that I had not 
                                                          
1 Post-positivist is a misleading term since it really 
refers to attempts to rescue positivism from its 
critiques; as such it is still positivism, but perhaps in 
a new guise – i.e. neo-positivism.  
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mentioned Haig at all.  My main motivation in 
referencing his article was that he is one of the 
few people writing about GTM who tries to 
take issue with what Urquhart terms the 
‘philosophical baggage’.  He recognizes that 
the simple use of induction that underlies 
‘classic’ GTM will not stand any close 
scrutiny – hence his accusation of ‘naïve 
Baconian inductivism‘ (not inductionism as 
Urquhart states it). 
Haig’s solution is to introduce the term 
phenomena and distinguish it from the term 
data.  His argument is not convincing and 
neither is it sustained, as I explain in my 
article.  It is, however, indicative of the real 
nub of the problem which is the term data.  
The quotes I offer in my original article, taken 
from a range of writing by both Glaser and 
Strauss (Glaser 1978, 1992, 1995, 1998, 1999, 
2002a, 2002b, Glaser and Strauss 1967, 
Strauss 1987, Strauss and Corbin 1989, 1990, 
1994), indicate that the concept of data is both 
central to the method – theory emerging from 
the data – but ultimately ill-defined and 
unexamined.  Urquhart tries to defend GTM 
from a simplistic view of data, arguing that 
coding somehow transforms data into 
something else – categories; but this  is 
unpersuasive, as it still begs the question how 
the categories are formed, and in what sense is 
the data transformed rather than merely 
categorized?  Urquhart feels she can go some 
way to answer this by saying that the process 
of coding is ‘subjective’ ; but it is not clear 
what she achieves by defining it in this way.  
She seems to be undermining her earlier claim 
that GTM is systematic, since some 
interpretations of the term ‘subjective’ would 
resonate with concepts such as personalized, 
idiosyncratic and diverse. 
The reason she gets rather tangled in 
her own argument is that she is unwilling to let 
go of the GTM mantra of theory being 
‘grounded in the data’.  Anyone making this 
sort of claim has to grapple with critiques of 
positivism and also point out how to overcome 
issues such as the Quine-Duhem thesis of 
underdetermination; i.e. that a theory is never 
fully determined by the facts, or data. 
GTM as stated by Glaser & Strauss 
cannot engage with these sorts of 
philosophical issues without emerging in a 
different form.  That was the point of my 
original article, and Urquhart seems to be 
heading in this direction when observing that 
GTM is essentially concerned with meaning 
construction.  Ultimately, however, she does 
not develop this point.  Were she to do so her 
conclusions would be far closer to mine, and 
also to those of Charmaz in her contribution to 
the 2nd edition of the Handbook of Qualitative 
Research.  Charmaz (2000) articulates the idea 
of constructivist GTM, contrasting it to 
objectivist GTM.  Glaser (2002) has responded 
directly to Charmaz, and I leave to the reader 
to decide who has the more coherent set of 
ideas. 
In conclusion I welcome Urquhart’s 
contribution as part of a continuing process of 
developing the method beyond its origins, and 
making it a key feature of IS research.  The 
question posed by Urquhart in the title of her 
reply must be answered by ‘yes’ to the first 
part, and ‘no’ to the second – Cathy Urquhart 
and I concur on that. 
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